CEREMADE - LEDa
Viossat Yannick
Associate Professor
Biography
Yannick Viossat is Assistant Professor of Mathematics at Université Paris Dauphine-PSL. After studying mathematics and biology at Ecole polytechnique, and a Master in Optimization, Games, and Modelization in Economics, he did a Ph.D. in game theory with Sylvain Sorin, and a post-doc at the Stockholm School of Economics. A member of the CEREMADE (the mathematics lab of Dauphine), and associated to the LEDa (the economics lab), he is an Associate Editor of Journal of Dynamics and Games. His main reserch interests are evolutionary game theory, and its applications in economics and biology. He also worked on the properties of Nash and correlated equilibria, and recently on the modelization of new types of cancer treatments (adaptive therapy, extinction therapy).
Publications
Articles
West J., Adler F., Gallaher J., Strobl M., Brady-Nicholls R., Brown J., Roberson-Tessi M., Kim E., Noble R., Viossat Y., Basanta D., Anderson A. (2023), A survey of open questions in adaptive therapy: Bridging mathematics and clinical translation, eLife, vol. 12 
Stein A., Salvioli M., Garjani H., Dubbeldam J., Viossat Y., Brown J., Staňková K. (2023), Stackelberg evolutionary game theory: how to manage evolving systems, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B - Biological Sciences, vol. 378, n°1876
Ashkenazi-Golan G., Tsodikovich Y., Viossat Y. (2023), I want to tell you? Maximizing revenue in first-price two-stage auctions, Economic Theory, n°76, p. 1329–1362
Mertikopoulos P., Viossat Y. (2022), Survival of dominated strategies under imitation dynamics, Journal of Dynamics and Games, vol. 9, n°4, p. 499-528
Noble R., Burri D., Le Sueur C., Lemant J., Viossat Y., Kather J., Beerenwinkel N. (2022), Spatial structure governs the mode of tumour evolution, Nature ecology & evolution, vol. 6, p. 207–217
Strobl M., West J., Viossat Y., Damaghi M., Robertson-Tessi M., Brown J., Gatenby R., Maini P., Anderson A. (2021), Turnover modulates the need for a cost of resistance in adaptive therapy, Cancer Research, vol. 81, n°4
Viossat Y., Noble R. (2021), A theoretical analysis of tumour containment, Nature ecology & evolution, vol. 5, p. 826-835
Cunningham J., Thuijsman F., Peeters R., Viossat Y., Brown J., Gatenby R., Staňková K. (2020), Optimal control to reach eco-evolutionary stability in metastatic castrate-resistant prostate cancer, PLoS ONE, vol. 15, n°12
Vigeral G., Viossat Y. (2016), Semi-algebraic sets and equilibria of binary games, Operations Research Letters, vol. 44, n°1, p. 19-24
Mertikopoulos P., Viossat Y. (2016), Imitation Dynamics with Payoff Shocks, International Journal of Game Theory, vol. 45, n°1, p. 291-320
Viossat Y. (2015), Evolutionary dynamics and dominated strategies, Economic Theory Bulletin, vol. 3, n°1, p. 91-113
Viossat Y. (2014), Game Dynamics and Nash Equilibria, Journal of Dynamics and Games, vol. 1, n°3, p. 537-553
Viossat Y., Zapechelnyuk A. (2013), No-regret Dynamics and Fictitious Play, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 148, n°2, p. 825-842
Jouini E., Napp C., Viossat Y. (2013), Evolutionary beliefs and financial markets, Review of Finance, vol. 17, n°2, p. 727-766
Viossat Y., Solan E., Lehrer E. (2011), Equilibrium payoffs of finite games, Journal of Mathematical Economics, vol. 47, n°1, p. 48-53
Viossat Y. (2010), Properties and applications of dual reduction, Economic Theory, vol. 44, n°1, p. 53-68
Hofbauer J., Viossat Y., Sorin S. (2009), Time average replicator and best reply dynamics, Mathematics of Operations Research, vol. 34, n°2, p. 263-269
Viossat Y. (2008), Is having a unique equilibrium robust?, Journal of Mathematical Economics, vol. 44, n°11, p. 1152-1160
Viossat Y. (2008), Evolutionary Dynamics May Eliminate All Strategies Used in Correlated Equilibria, Mathematical Social Sciences, vol. 56, n°1, p. 27-43
Viossat Y. (2008), Is Having a Unique Equilibrium Robust?, Journal of Mathematical Economics, vol. 44, n°11, p. 1152-1160
Viossat Y. (2007), The Replicator Dynamics Does not Lead to Correlated Equilibria, Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 59, n°2, p. 397-407
Viossat Y., Michod R., Solari C., Nedelcu A., Hurand M. (2006), Life-History Evolution and the Origin of Multicellularity, Journal of Theoretical Biology, vol. 239, n°2, p. 257-272
Prépublications / Cahiers de recherche
West J., Adler F., Gallaher J., Strobl M., Brown J., Brady-Nicholls R., Robertson-Tessi M., Kim E., Noble R., Viossat Y., Basanta D., Anderson A. (2022), A survey of open questions in adaptive therapy : bridging mathematics and clinical translation, Paris, Cahier de recherche CEREMADE, Université Paris Dauphine-PSL, 27 p.
Alvarez Borges F., Viossat Y. (2022), Tumor containment for Norton-Simon models, Paris, Cahier de recherche CEREMADE, Université Paris Dauphine-PSL, 31 p.
Ashkenazi-Golan G., Tsodikovich Y., Viossat Y. (2020), I Want to Tell You?Maximizing Revenue in First-Price Two-Stage Auctions, Cahier de recherche CEREMADE, Université Paris Dauphine-PSL, 26 p.
Viossat Y., Noble R. (2020), The logic of containing tumors, Cahier de recherche CEREMADE, Université Paris Dauphine-PSL, 16 p.
Viossat Y. (2011), Deterministic monotone dynamics and dominated strategies, Paris, Université Paris-Dauphine, 20 p.
Viossat Y. (2006), Openness of the Set of Games with a Unique Correlated Equilibrium, Cahiers du Laboratoire d'Econométrie, Ecole Polytechnique, 17 p.
Viossat Y. (2005), Replicator Dynamics and Correlated Equilibrium: Elimination of all Strategies in the Support of Correlated Equilibria, Massy-Palaiseau, Cahiers du Laboratoire d'Econométrie, 13 p.
Viossat Y. (2004), Replicator Dynamics and Correlated Equilibrium, Massy-Palaiseau, Cahiers du Laboratoire d'Econométrie, 12 p.
Viossat Y. (2003), Elementary Games and Games whose Correlated Equilibrium Polytope has Full Dimension, Cahiers du Laboratoire d'Econométrie, Ecole Polytechnique, 11 p.
Viossat Y. (2003), Geometry, Correlated Equilibria and Zero-Sum Games, Cahiers du Laboratoire d'Econométrie, Ecole Polytechnique, 19 p.
Viossat Y. (2003), Properties of Dual Reduction, Paris, Cahiers du Laboratoire d'Econométrie, Ecole Polytechnique, 28 p.