Forges Françoise

Articles

Forges F., Koessler F., Salamanca A. (2024), Interacting mechanisms: A perspective on generalized principal–agent problems, Journal of Mathematical Economics, vol. 114, p. 103023

Forges F., Ray I. (2024), “Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies”: Back to the roots, Journal of Mathematical Economics, vol. 114, p. 103044

Forges F. (2023), Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information, Revue économique, vol. 74, n°2023/4, p. 529-539

Sémirat S., Forges F. (2022), Strategic information transmission with sender’s approval: the single-crossing case, Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 134, p. 242-263

Forges F., Sákovics J. (2022), Tenable threats when Nash equilibrium is the norm, International Journal of Game Theory, n°51, p. 589-605

Forges F., Renault J. (2021), Strategic information transmission with sender's approval, International Journal of Game Theory, vol. 50, n°2, p. 475-502

Forges F. (2020), Games with incomplete information: from repetition to cheap talk and persuasion, Annals of Economics and Statistics, n°137, p. 3-30

Forges F., Horst U. (2018), Sender-receiver games with cooperation, Journal of Mathematical Economics, vol. 76, p. 52 - 61

Forges F. (2017), Coopération en information incomplète: quelques modèles stratégiques, Revue d'économie politique, vol. 127, n°4, p. 467-493

Forges F., Horst U., Salomon A. (2016), Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games, International Journal of Game Theory, vol. 45, n°1, p. 11-36

Forges F., Salomon A. (2015), Bayesian repeated games and reputation, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 159, p. 70-104

Eliaz K., Forges F. (2015), Information Disclosure to Cournot duopolists, Economics Letters, vol. 126, p. 167-170

Forges F. (2014), Interview with Jean-François Mertens (1946-2012), Macroeconomic Dynamics, vol. 18, n°8, p. 1832 - 1853

Forges F., Minelli E. (2014), Corrigendum to “Self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations”, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 151, p. 605-606

Iehlé V., Forges F. (2014), Afriat's theorem for indivisible goods, Journal of Mathematical Economics, vol. 54, p. 1-6

Iehlé V., Forges F. (2013), Essential Data, Budget Sets and Rationalization, Economic Theory, vol. 54, n°3, p. 449-461

Serrano R., Forges F. (2013), Cooperative Games with Incomplete Information : Some Open Problems, International Game Theory Review, vol. 15, n°2, p. 21

Forges F., Haeringer G., Iehlé V. (2013), Appariement : des modèles de Lloyd Shapley à la conception de marchés d'Alvin Roth, Revue d'économie politique, vol. 123, n°5, p. 663-696

Vida P., Forges F. (2013), Implementation of Communication Equilibria by Correlated Cheap Talk : the Two-Player Case, Theoretical Economics, vol. 8, n°1, p. 95-123

Forges F. (2013), A folk theorem for Bayesian games with commitment, Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 78, n°1, p. 64-71

Forges F. (2013), J.-F. Mertens (1946-2012) : Des jeux répétés a l'analyse "coùt-bénéfice", Revue française d'économie, vol. 27, n°3, p. 19-34

Biran O., Forges F. (2011), Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values, Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 73, n°1, p. 52-64

Orzach R., Forges F. (2011), Core-stable rings in second price auctions with common values, Journal of Mathematical Economics, vol. 47, n°6, p. 760-767

Forges F., Minelli E. (2009), Afriat's theorem for general budget sets, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 144, n°1, p. 135-145

Koessler F., Forges F. (2008), Long persuasion games, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 143, n°1, p. 1-35

Von Stengel B., Forges F. (2008), Extensive form correlated equilibrium: definition and computational complexity, Mathematics of Operations Research, vol. 33, n°4, p. 1002-1022

Koessler F., Forges F. (2008), Multistage communication with and without verifiable types, International Game Theory Review, vol. 10, n°2, p. 145-164

Forges F., Koessler F. (2008), Transmission stratégique de l'information et certification, Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, n°89, p. 3-61

Forges F. (2007), Leonid Hurwicz, Eric Maskin, Roger Myerson et la théorie des mécanismes, Revue d'économie politique, vol. 117, n°6, p. 873-890

Barbar R., Forges F. (2007), Collusion dans les enchères : quelques apports des jeux coopératifs, Revue économique, vol. 58, n°5, p. 965-984

Forges F. (2006), Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information revisited, Theory and Decision, vol. 61, n°4, p. 329-344

Forges F. (2006), Feasible mechanisms in economies with type-dependent endowments, Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 26, n°2, p. 403-419

Forges F., Koessler F. (2005), Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types, Journal of Mathematical Economics, vol. 41, n°7, p. 793-811

Forges F. (2005), The ex ante incentive compatible core of an exchange economy with and without indivisibilities, Economie publique, vol. 2, n°17, p. 141-159

Forges F. (2004), The ex ante incentive compatible core of the assignement game, Mathematical Social Sciences, vol. 47, n°2, p. 135-151

Forges F., Mertens J-F., Vohra R. (2002), The ex ante incentive compatible core in the absence of wealth effects, Econometrica, vol. 70, n°5, p. 1865–1892

Heifetz A., Minelli E., Forges F. (2001), Incentive compatible core and competitive equilibria in differential information economies, Economic Theory, vol. 18, n°2, p. 349-365

Forges F., Minelli E. (2001), A note on the incentive compatible core, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 98, n°1, p. 179-188

Minelli E., Forges F. (1997), Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms and Rational Expectations, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 75, n°2, p. 388–406

Chapitres d'ouvrage

Forges F. (1993), Some thoughts on efficiency and information, in Tani, Piero, Frontiers of game theory, Cambridge: MIT Press, p. 357

Thisse J-F., Forges F. (1992), Game theory and industrial economics : an introduction, in Norman, George, The new industrial economics : recent developments in industrial organization, oligopoly and game theory, Aldershot: Edward Elgar, p. 271

Forges F. (1992), Repeated games of incomplete information : non-zero-sum, in Hart, Sergiu, Handbook of game theory with economic applications, Amsterdam: Elsevier, p. 2566

Forges F. (1991), Sunspot equilibrium as a game theoretical solution concept, in Barnett, William A., Proceedings of the Sixth International Symposium in Economic Theory and Econometrics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 492

Forges F. (1990), Repeated Games with Incomplete Information, in Tauman, Yair, Game Theory and Applications, San Diego: Elsevier, p. 64-76

Mertens J-F., Forges F. (1988), Stratégies d'entreprises et avantages de la coopération : l'apport de la théorie des jeux, in , Gestion de l'économie de l'entreprise : l'approche quantitative, Bruxelles: De Boeck, p. 492

Communications sans actes

Forges F. (2019), Games with incomplete information: from repetition to cheap talk and persuasion, 72nd ESEM (European meeting of the Econometric Society), Manchester, Royaume-Uni

Forges F. (2012), Folk theorems for Bayesian (public good) games, PET (Public Economic Theory) 2012, Taipei, TaÏwan, province de chine

Forges F. (2010), Communication in Bayesian games: Overview of work on implementing mediators in game theory, Decentralized Mechanism Design, Distributed Computing and Cryptography Workshop, Princeton, NJ, États-Unis

Prépublications / Cahiers de recherche

Sémirat S., Forges F. (2023), Forward-neologism-proof equilibrium and better response dynamics, Paris, Preprints LEDa, 39 p.

Sakovics J., Forges F. (2021), Tenable threats when Nash equilibrium is the norm, Economics Department Discussion papers series, 21 p.

Sémirat ., Forges F. (2021), Strategic information transmission with sender’s approval: the single crossing case, working paper GAEL, 36 p.

Forges F., Horst U., Salomon A. (2014), Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games, Paris, Cahier de recherche CEREMADE, Université Paris Dauphine-PSL, 30 p.

Forges F. (2011), Bayesian games with contracts, Paris, Université Paris-Dauphine, 14 p.

Iehlé V., Forges F. (2010), Essential budgetary information in revealed preference analysis, Paris, Université Paris-Dauphine